Indifference to eternal life and to eternal value
Epicurus argues that we should not fear death because we won't be there to feel pain. This is an excellent argument against concern for eternal life--if the only thing we desire is pleasure and the only thing we want to avoid is pain. But it might not be such a great argument if humans naturally desire more than that. And we do. We desire not just to feel a certain way, but to act a certain way. And the objects of those actions are valued by us not just because of how they affect us, but because of how they relate us to the rest of the world. Consider the desire to know the truth. Based on my very limited reading of Epicurus, he never seems to talk about the desire for the truth. If he did, then he might quickly see how his philosophy fails to make sense of human life. We desire to know the truth: that much is uncontroversial. But if pleasure is the first and primary measure of what is good, then we desire the truth only instrumental...