Kant and friendship
When you love a friend, you love, among other things, what you do together. The "together" is something not in your mind, not in your friend's mind. Nor is it in your or your friend's will. Nor is it the sum of your will plus the other's will. It is, in a sense, between the two of you. It is something both of you possess. You both engage, for example, in conversation: the quintessential activity of friends. Both of you experience and share in one and the same conversation, just as you share one and the same friendship. In fact, conversation and friendship can exist only by being shared in common. To regard friendship as good is to regard as a public thing that which cannot be reduced to one individual's will or another's, nor to the summation of their two wills. There is no room for such public goods as conversation, friendship in Kant's conception of a pure will. Two friends have two wills. According to Kant, they can ...