The Experience Machine

The best way to think about Nozik's Experience Machine thought experiment is to see it,  as not just clarifying what it is that we really desire (i.e., we desire to engage reality through our actions) but rather as teaching us how we ought to look at our present situation.  Or rather, since "ought" has deontological resonances that I wish to avoid, I would say that the Experience Machine teaches us what sort of attitude toward reality and toward the imaginary we will have if we are to flourish as human beings.  We are better off preferring reality to the Experience Machine than we would be if we preferred the Experience Machine to reality.

If you wish that you could be in the experience machine having a positive experience rather than in the real world, which sometimes gives you situations that are undesirable, then you are looking at everything around you in an instrumentalizing way.  When the EM lover (that is, the person who would prefer a positive experience in the EM to a messy experience in reality) does something good, like helping a senior citizen fix his or her flat tire or give directions to an out-of-towner lost in the city and needs directions, he or she is acting so that he or she can think of themselves as a nice citizen rather than doing it so as to be a nice citizen.  When the EM lover relates positively to his or her beloved spouse, he or she is doing it so that you can think of yourself as in a positive relationship rather than doing it so that you can simply be in a positive relationship.  One who thinks thus is not thinking of the real relationships in the world as having intrinsic value: they are a means toward a certain state of mind.  Value resides in his or her mind, not in the world.

Contrast that with the person who rejects the EM option: he or she does so because of a love for the world about him/her.  This person will love, desire and enjoy just relationships with strangers and friendship with those with whom he or she is familiar as good.  He or she will love these rather than consider them as useful to producing a state of mind. 

If there is someone in your life who loves you, you would prefer to be loved by them as the EM rejector loves rather than as the EM acceptor.  For former will love you for who you are, not for what you seem to be.  Whereas the EM acceptor's love will be tentative: if a more gratifying fantasy becomes available, you may be dumped for EM.


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