Killing to save lives
Suppose you are a very rich person and you have devoted your life to helping others. You become a social worker. It is very important to you to be clear about your motivation for doing what you do. You help each person because there is something good about them that moves you to fill goodwill toward him or her. Take, for example a person whom we shall pretend has the nickname "X": you help X because you have good will toward X. That is, on a certain level (not a romantic one) you love X simply because X is a fellow human being. We could call this sameness that you and S share "solidarity": it is your perception or apprehension of this real solidarity with X that motivates you to wish X well. For it seems to you that your goodwill toward X is inseparable from your desire for your own happiness.
Let us contrast your attitude toward X with that of a social engineer who doesn't care for X in a personal way but does want to maximize pleasure in society. That person might wish X well, but not for X's sake. This social engineer views X's pleasure as part of a whole. That is, what the social engineer is concerned about first and foremost is the greatest amount of pleasure in society as a whole. X's pleasure is just a fraction of what the principal concern of the social engineer. So the social engineer, when relating to X, is always weighing X's pleasure fulfillment against that of others in society. It is quite conceivable that there may be situations where the social engineer will sacrifice X's pleasure for the greater good of society as a whole. At the end of the day, the engineer looks at X in instrumental terms.
Can one who adopts the attitude of a social engineer have goodwill towards X? Can someone who thinks as a social engineer whenever awake be a friend or potential friend to X?
I propose that the answer to that question is no.
In order to demonstrate that this answer is correct, I ask you to do the following thought experiment, which is obviously based on something written by Bernard Williams.
Suppose that up until now, you have been best friends with X. You have goodwill towards X, with all that this goodwill entails (and is described above).
You also know another person, Y. You are acquainted with Y but are not friends. That is because Y is an outsider to your group. Nevertheless you know Y well enough to know that you could become good friends with Y if the circumstances were right. But they are not right: you and Y belong to different groups that do not coexist. But you know Y is a very good person and have goodwill toward Y as well.
Suppose that, even though Y is innocent of any crime that could conceivably merit even mild punishment, you discover that Y's being alive is in the way of the progress of society. You find yourself in the following dilemma: you can save the life of 19 people by killing Y.
If you kill Y and do not regret it, will it still be possible to have goodwill towards X?
I propose that if you kill Y, thereby treating Y as a mere means toward an end, you will be unable to have goodwill toward X. For if the same goodness exists in Y that is in X, then you are in principle just as likely to kill X if doing so would benefit the greater good. But if you are willing to do that, then you are interested in X's well-being only inasmuch as it is instrumental toward the good of society as a whole. You look at at X as a mere means toward an end, but that is not consistent with goodwill. It is not a loving attitude. Killing Y has deformed your relationship with X. By killing Y, and not regretting it, you have become an unjust person, incapable of true friendship.
To adopt the attitude of a social pleasure engineer, then, is to undermine not only justice, but friendship.
Let us contrast your attitude toward X with that of a social engineer who doesn't care for X in a personal way but does want to maximize pleasure in society. That person might wish X well, but not for X's sake. This social engineer views X's pleasure as part of a whole. That is, what the social engineer is concerned about first and foremost is the greatest amount of pleasure in society as a whole. X's pleasure is just a fraction of what the principal concern of the social engineer. So the social engineer, when relating to X, is always weighing X's pleasure fulfillment against that of others in society. It is quite conceivable that there may be situations where the social engineer will sacrifice X's pleasure for the greater good of society as a whole. At the end of the day, the engineer looks at X in instrumental terms.
Can one who adopts the attitude of a social engineer have goodwill towards X? Can someone who thinks as a social engineer whenever awake be a friend or potential friend to X?
I propose that the answer to that question is no.
In order to demonstrate that this answer is correct, I ask you to do the following thought experiment, which is obviously based on something written by Bernard Williams.
Suppose that up until now, you have been best friends with X. You have goodwill towards X, with all that this goodwill entails (and is described above).
You also know another person, Y. You are acquainted with Y but are not friends. That is because Y is an outsider to your group. Nevertheless you know Y well enough to know that you could become good friends with Y if the circumstances were right. But they are not right: you and Y belong to different groups that do not coexist. But you know Y is a very good person and have goodwill toward Y as well.
Suppose that, even though Y is innocent of any crime that could conceivably merit even mild punishment, you discover that Y's being alive is in the way of the progress of society. You find yourself in the following dilemma: you can save the life of 19 people by killing Y.
If you kill Y and do not regret it, will it still be possible to have goodwill towards X?
I propose that if you kill Y, thereby treating Y as a mere means toward an end, you will be unable to have goodwill toward X. For if the same goodness exists in Y that is in X, then you are in principle just as likely to kill X if doing so would benefit the greater good. But if you are willing to do that, then you are interested in X's well-being only inasmuch as it is instrumental toward the good of society as a whole. You look at at X as a mere means toward an end, but that is not consistent with goodwill. It is not a loving attitude. Killing Y has deformed your relationship with X. By killing Y, and not regretting it, you have become an unjust person, incapable of true friendship.
To adopt the attitude of a social pleasure engineer, then, is to undermine not only justice, but friendship.
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